Theo Swan Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. et al : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1956
Theo Swan Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. et
al : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; Wayne L. Black; N. J. Cotro-Manes; Counsel for Defendants
and Appellants;
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., No. 8246 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2279
Case No. 82'16 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S.TATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA .. · 
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN 
.HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-V3.-
W ALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament 
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased; 
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL 
KOSTOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Grant Macfarlane 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
N. J. COTRO-MANES 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos 
430 Judge Building 
Salt. Lake City, Utah 
RECEIVED 
LIH1 L ll.J~ a AtU 
U. of U. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PETITION FOR REHEARING ...... ---------------------------------------------- 1 
CERTIFICATE ------------------------------- ___ --------------------- ________ ----------------. 4 
BRIEF IN SUPPOR.T OF PETITION FOR R.EHEARING.... 4 
POINT I. THIS ·COURT, BY ITS OPINION HEREIN, 
HAS DECLARED THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF 
FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE ARISING OUT 
OF CONFIDEN'TIAL RELATIONSHIP, PROCURE-
MENT OF A WILL AND HEIRSHIP SHIFTS THE 
BURDEN TO THE CONFIDEN'TIAL ADVISOR OF 
PERSUADING THE FACT FINDER BY A "PRE-
PONDERANCE" OF THE EVIDE:t~CE THAT NO 
FRAUD OR UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED. 
THE TRIAL COUR.T ERRONEOUSLY IMPOSED UP-
ON THE PROPONENTS OF THIS WILL THE BUR-
DEN OF ESTABLISHING LACK OF FRAUD AND 
UNDUE INFLUENCE BY "CLEAR AND CONVINC-
ING" EVIDENCE. INASMUCH AS A GREATER BUR-
DEN OF PROOF WAS IMPOSED UPON PROPON-
ENTS THAN THIS ·COURT HAS DECLARED TO BE 
PROPER, THE PROPONEN'TS SHOULD BE GRANT-· 
ED A NEW TRIAL. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT II. THIS COURT HAS HELD AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 'THAT GAIL SWAN HAD TESTAMENTARY 
CAP A CITY TO MAKE A WILL. THE ERRONEOUS 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT GAIL LACKED TESTAMENTARY 
CAPA~CITY TO MAKE A WILL VITALLY AFFECTED 
THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE 
OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE AND 
THEREBY PREJUDICED THE PROPONENTS. ------------ 19 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS MEMORAN-
DUM DECISION, ERRONEOU·SLY DECLARED 
THAT IT WAS MACFARLANE'S "~CLEAR, UNRE-
VOCABLE DUTY" TO SEE TO IT THAT WILDA 
GAIL SWAN HAD INDEPENDEN·T ADVICE IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE PREPARATION AND 
SIGNING OF THE WILLS AND CODICILS. THIS 
COURT STATES IN ITS DE·CISION HEREIN, "AS 
IN THE JARDINE CASE, WE RECOGNIZE SUCH 
A SHOWING AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN DE-
TERMINING THIS QUESTION AND REJECT THE 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
DOCTRINE THAT WITHOU·T IT SUCH A PRE-
SUM·P'TION IS IRREBUTTABLE." THIS •COURT 
SHOULD. GRANT A NEW TRIAL SO THAT THE 
TRIER OF THE FACT MAY CONSIDER LACK OF 
INDEPENDENT ADVICE NOT AS AN "UNREVOK-
ABLE" O·BSTACL·E OF PROOF ON THE PAR'T OF 
THE CONFIDEN'TIAL ADVISOR, BUT ONLY AS 
AN "IMPORTANT F AQTOR." -------------------------------------------- 22 
POIN·T IV. THIS COURT HAS REJE•CTED 'THE "PRIMA 
FACIE EVIDENCE RULE" ADVOCATED BY PRO-
PONENTS AND HAS APPROVED THE "PREPOND-
ERANCE OF 'THE EVIDENCE RULE." WITH TI-IE 
BURDEN OF PROVING A LACK OF FRAUD AND 
UNDUE INFLUENCE BY A PREPONDERAN,CE OF 
THE EVIDENCE R.ESTING WITH PROPONENTS, 
THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE 
OVER OBJECTION OF DEFENDANTS O·F THE 
FILE IN THE BECKER MATTER INDICATING 
THA1T ONCE BEFORE MACFARLANE HAD BEEN 
A~CCUSED OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE 
WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL. THE FACT THE 
TRIAL COURT STA·TED THAT I-IE THOUGHT 
SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PROPER AND WAS AD-
MISSIBLE INDICA1TES THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
CONSIDERED IMPROPER MATTERS IN ARRIVING 
A1T I'TS D E•CI SIO N. -------------------------------------------------------------- 25 
CO N~CL U SIO N ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
AU'THORITIES CITED 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986 ____________________ 15 
Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 55·3____________________ 6 
Baldwin v. Nielson, 110 Utah 172, 170 P. 2d 179 ____________________ 10 
Bradley v. Miller, 109 Utah 538, 167 P. 2d 978 .. ---------------------- 10 
Bryan's Estate, In re, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609................ 6 
Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P. 2d 118 .... ---------------- 6 
Clark v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 275 Pac. 
582 -------------------- ... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Davis v. Meyer, 115 Neb. 251, 212 N.W. 435, 50 ALR 1410 ____ 29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE O·F CtQiNTENT'S____.CContinued) 
Page 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Utah, 249 P. 2d 213 ..... ----------------------------------- 7 
Hansen's Estate, In re, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103 ________________ 18 
Hartman v. Evands, 38 W. Va. 669, 18 S.E. 810 ____________________ 29 
Hickey v. Rio Grande vVestern Ry. Co., 29 Utah 392, 82 Pac. 
29 .... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Kirchgester v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company, Utah, 225 P. 2d 754·----------------------------------------- 13 
Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 45'4-------------------- 12 
John Ainsfield •Co. v. Rasmussen, 30 Utah 453, 85 Pac. 1002 .... 15 
King v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 116 Utah 
488, 211 p. 2d 833 ..... --------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
La Velie's Estate, In re, 248 P. 2d 372 ...... ---------------------------------- 6 
Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285____________________________ 6 
Newell's Estate, In re, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230________________________ 6 
N orthcrest Incorporated v. Walker Bank and Trust Company, 
et al., 248 P. 2d 692 .. ---------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
Pilcher's Estate, In re, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143________________ 8 
Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12____________________________ 6 
Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 Pac. 71.___________ 7 
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177.----------------------------------- 7 
State v. Steadman, 70 Utah 224, 259 Pac. 326 ________________________ 10 
State v. Whitely, 110 P. 2d 337 ...... -------------------------------------------------- 18 
Stoker v. Ogden City, 54 P. 2d 849·--------------------------------------------- 15 
Swan's Estate, In re, 51 Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452 ____________________ 18 
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 242 P. 2d 764, 
7 69 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P. 2d 291. _______________________ 17 
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 ____________________________ 10 
Wilkinson v. Anderson Taylor Co., 28 Utah 346, 79 Pac. 46 ____ 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of WILDA 
GAIL SWAN, deceased, THEO SWAN 
HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament 
of WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased; 
GRANT. MACFARLANE; DANIEL 
KOSTOPULOS and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
and 
BRIEF I:t-;r SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
8216 
COME NOW Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kostopu-
los, defendants and appellants herein, and respectfully 
petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the 
above-entitled case and for an order rnodifying this 
Uourt's decision by granting to your petitioners a new 
trial in accordance with the law as declared in said deci-
BlOll. 
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We appreciate the fact that many petitions for re-
hearing are mere formalities which do not raise new and 
unlitig.ated issues. \Ve submit, however, that such is 
not the case here. This Court has rendered a decision 
\Yhich, by its very nature creates problems and issues 
heretofore never briefed or argued by either party. Each 
of these issues separately, and all of them collectively, 
are focal points upon which the ultimate decision in this 
case could well turn. 
This Petition is based on the following grounds: 
Point I. 
This court, by its opinion herein, has declared that 
the presumption of fraud and undue influence arising 
out of confidential relationship, procurement of a will 
and heirship shifts the burden to the confidential advisor 
of persuading the fact finder by a "preponderance" of the 
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted. 
The trial court erroneously imposed upon the proponents 
of this vvill the burden of establishing lack of fraud and 
undue influence by "clear and convincing" evidence. In-
asmuch as a greater burden of proof was imposed upon 
proponents than this Court has declared to be proper, 
the proponents should be granted a new trial. 
Point II. 
This court has held as ;a 1natter of law that Gail 
Swan had testimentary capacity to make a will. The 
E·rroneous findings and conclusions of the trial court that 
Gail lacked testamentary capacity to make a will vitally 
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affected the weight of evidence on the issue of fraud and 
undue influence and thereby prejudiced the proponents. 
Point III. 
The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, erron-
eously declared that it was Macfarlane's "clear, unrevoc-
able duty" to see to it that Wilda G.ail Swan had inde-
pendent advice in connection with the preparation and 
signing of the will and codicils. This court states in its 
d.ecision herein, "As in the Jardine case, we recognize 
such a showing as an important factor in determining 
this question and reject the doctrine that without it such 
presumption is irrebutable." This court should grant a 
ne-vv trial so that the trier of the fact may consider lack 
of independent advice not as an "unrevokable" obstacle 
of proof on the part of the confidential advisor, but only 
as an important factor. 
Point IV. 
This court has rejected the "prima facie evidence 
1ule" advocated by proponents and has approved the 
'·preponderance of the evidence rule." With the burden 
of proving a lack of fraud and undue influence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence re·sting with proponents, the 
erroneous admission into evidence over objection of de-
fendant of the file in the Becker matter indicating that 
once before Macfarlane had been accused of fraud and 
undue influence was highly prejudicial. The fact the trial 
court stated that he thought such evidence was proper 
and was admissible indicates that the trial court con-
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sidered improper matters in arriving at its decision. 
Accompanying this Petition and filed here·with is .a 
Brief in Support Thereof. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Wayne L. Black 
Counsel for Defendant and 
· Appellant} Grant Macfarlane 
N. J. Cotro-Manes 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appel.lantJ Daniel K ostopulos 
I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for 
the defendant, Gr.ant Macfarlane, who is a petitioner 
herein, and that in my opinion, there is good cause to 
believe the judgment objected to is erroneous and that 
the case should be re-examined as prayed for in said 
petition. 
DATED this ________________________ day of l\Iarch, 1956. 
Wayne L. Black 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
. THIS 1COUR.T, BY ITS OPINION HEREIN, HAS DE-
CLARED THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD AND UN-
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DUE INFLUENCE ARISING OUT OF CONFIDENTIAL RE-
LATIONSHIP, PROCUREMENT OF A WILL AND HEIRSHIP 
SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE CONFIDENTIAL ADVISOR 
OF PERSUADING THE FACT FINDER BY A "PREPON-
DERANCE'' OF THE EVIDENCE THAT NO FRAUD OR 
UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS EXERTED. THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY IMPOSED UPON THE PROPONENTS OF 
THIS WILL THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING LACK OF 
FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE BY "CLEAR AND CON-
VINCING" EVIDENCE. INASMUCH AS A GREATER BUR-
DEN OF PROOF WAS IMPOSED UPON PROPONENTS 
THAN 'THIS COURT HAS DE,CLARED TO BE PROPER, 
'I'I-IE PROPONEN·TS SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL. 
Mr. Justice Wade, in his 1fajority Opinion, reviews 
the Utah c.ases concerning the legal effects of various 
})resumptions. He states: 
"Some opinions in this court have held that 
the only effect of a presumption is to place on 
the disfavored party the burden of producing 
prima facie evidence to the contrary and there-
upon the presumption is eliminated, and it is 
firmly established that such is the effect of many 
preslunptions. Hovvever, we have also recognized 
that other presumptions are not so eliminated but 
have the effect of placing on the disfavored party 
the burden of persuading the fact finder that the 
facts are contrary to the presumed facts; some 
by a preponderance of the evidence, others by 
clear and convincing evidence, and still others bY 
proof beyond reasonable doubt. * * * " .. 
Thus, it can be seen th.at four lines of decisions have 
existed in the State of Utah. For the sake of brevity, 
,~·e 'vill refer to said lines of decisions as the "prin~a facie 
evidence rule," the "preponderance of the evidence rule,'' 
the "clear and convincing evidence· rule," and the "beyonfl 
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H reasonable doubt rule." The "beyond a reasonable 
doubt rule" has .application primarily to criminal cases 
nnd is of no concern to us here. 
At the trial of· this case the position of proponents 
\Vas that the "prima facie evidence rule" was applicable. 
Proponents cited in support of their position In re 
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609, where~ 
Catholic priest had procured a 'vill in which his church 
\Vas m.ade a principal beneficiary and where the court 
~tated: 
"This court is committed to the doctrine that, 
when facts and circumstances are shown concern-
ing whioh a presumption arises or is indulged, the 
presumption ceases, and the case is to be decided 
on the evidence introduced independently of the 
presumption; that is, that the presumption is not 
evidence and has no weight as evidence. In re 
Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230, and 
{3tate v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177." 
In the Bryan case, the burden of proving fraud and 
undue influence shifted back to the party claiming such 
fraud and undue influence upon the introduction of prima 
facie evidence of a lack of fraud and undue influence. 
We believed that the Bryan case correctly stated the law 
as it existed in Utah at the tune of trial. We also cited 
1o the trial court In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 
5 P. 2d 2·30; Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 
553; In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P. 2d 372; Peterson v. 
Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12; Buhler v. Maddison, 
109 Utah 267, 176 P. 2d 118; M echarn v. Allen, 1 Utah 
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2d 79, 262 P. 2d 285; Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co., 242 P. 2d 764, 769; Gibbs v. Blue Cab,, 
________ Utah ________ , 249 P. 2d 213; State v. Green, 78 Utah 
580, 6 P. 2d 177; Clark v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 73 
Utah 486, 275 Pac. 582; Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
46 Utah 530, 151 Pac. 71; King v. Denver & Rio Grande 
TV estern Railroad Co., 116 Utah 488; 211 P. 2d 833. 
Justice Hoyt in his dissenting opinion appears to be 
of the opinion that we were correct in our position. He 
states: 
" * * * I am strongly in favor of retention of 
the rule heretofore repeatedly announced by this 
court ,and adopted by the American Law Institute 
that when rebutting evidence is introduced, the 
issue should be decided upon the evidence - with-
out having the jury or trier of the facts confus.ed 
by incoinprehensible explanations as to the ef-
fect of a presumption or as to the quantum of 
proof required to overcome a given presumption. 
* * * " 
Counsel for the contestant on the other hand con-
tPnded vigorously that the "clear and convincing evidence 
rule" was the proper principle of law to be applied in 
the case. In their written 1nemor.andun1 to the trial court 
follovving the oral .arguments, counsel repeatedly referred 
to the "clear and convincing evidence rule" citing cases 
in support thereof. At page 8 of said Memorandum ap-
pears the following statement: 
" * * * The 'basic facts' so proven are of 
such substance and of such probative value that 
their establishment results in the conviction that 
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undue influence was exercised, and such convic-
tion can be dissipated and ove~rcome only by clear 
and convincing evidence that there was no undue 
influence." 
Counsel then cited the case of In re Pilcher's Estate, 
114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143. On the same page, counsel 
stated: 
"There are two decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Utah which leave it clear beyond .any 
doubt that the burden lay upon the defendants 
to clearly prove the absence of undue influence. 
They are Peterson v. Budge, 35 Utah 596, 102 
Pac. 211, and Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 
72 Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797." 
And ag.ain at page 17 of said Memorandum, counsel 
stated: 
"The basic facts showing the relationships 
between l\{acf.arlane and Kostopulos on the one 
side and Gail on the other persist from the be-
ginning of the trial until the end, and because they 
do presist the legal result of such facts requires 
a finding of undue influence unless there is clear 
and convincing proof to the contrary. * * * " 
The urgency with which counsel foi" contestant have 
g}ways contended for the "cle:ar and convincing evidence 
rule" can be fully appreciated by an examination of the 
Brief of Respondent on Appeal." At page 27 of coun-
sel's brief ,the following statement appears: 
" * * * When such proof was made the bur-
den was then cast upon defendants to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence the .absence of fraud 
and undue influence. It was up to the trial court 
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as the trier of the facts to determine whether 
defendant had furnished the necessary proof. 
* * * " 
At p.age 30, counsel quotes the following from the 
Pilcher case, supra: 
" * * * Such presumption presists until it is 
overcome by clear, convincing and conclusive ev-
idence." 
Commenting on said statement as follows: 
"The decision in the Pilcher case is a con-
clusive answer to the suggestion of the defendants 
that the presumption of undue influence has 
vanished from the instant case. * * * " 
Counsel then discussed at length the Jardine case, 
the Peterson case and Omega case and su1nmarizes as 
follows: 
"The basic facts showing the relationships 
between ~1acfarlane and Kostopulos on the one 
side and Gail on the other persists from the be-
ginning of the trial until the end, and because 
they do persist the legal result of such facts re-
quires a finding of undue influence unless there 
is clear and convincing proof to the contrary. 
Such is the holding of the many cases which are 
cited below." 
And then at page 56, counsel states: 
"All of appellant's conclusions reflect upon 
appellant's refusal to appreciate or recognize the 
r1tle of law that imposed upon them th~e burden of 
freeing then~selves froJn the charge of undue in-
fluence by clear and convincing evidence." 
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At the time of trial the only Utah cases supporting 
the "preponderance of evidence rule" were Walton v. 
Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97; Baldwin v. Nielson, 
110 Utah 172,170 P. 2d 179; Bradley v. Miller, 109 Utah 
f>38, 167 P. 2d 978 .and State v. Steadman, 70 Utah 224, 
259 Pac. 326. None of these cases \vere ever cited or 
n1entioned by contestant either at the time of trial or 
on .appeal. The Walton case involved the presumption 
that the best interests of a child are served by its being 
in the custody of its natural parents. The court held 
that such presumption could be overcome by a preponder-
ance of evidence to the contrary. The Baldwin case and 
the Bradley case involved the same presumption \vith 
the same holding. The Steadman c.ase involved the pre-
sumption of innocence of a defendant in a bastardy pro-
ceeding. The court pointed out that a bastardy proceed-
ing is not criminal in nature and that the presumption 
of innocence, although it existed, could nevertheless be 
overcome by a preponderance of evidence to the contrary. 
The situation thus confronting the trial court was 
as follows: The proponents of the will eontended vigor-
ously for the "prima facie evidence rule." The contestant 
of the \vill contended with equal vigor for the "clear and 
convincing evidence rule." No one had the remotest idea 
that the law of Utah required the proponents to establish 
a lack of fraud and undue influence by a '·preponderance 
of the evidence." Certainly the trial court never expres-
~ed his belief that such was the law in Utah. He followed 
counsel for contestant's view of the law at every stage 
in the proceedings and adopted the Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel without so 
n1uch as the change of a comma. 
If the trial court had followed the "prima facie 
evidence rule" the decision would have been in favor 
of proponents. This court in its majority opinion, has 
conceded such to be the fact where it states : 
"Under such rule the trial court's finding of 
fraud and undue influence probably is not sup-
ported by the evidenee 7 but if the burden of per-
suasion is shifted the finding is supported by 
proof of the basic faets of the presumption." 
Justice lioyt put the 1natter somewhat stronger in 
his dissenting opinion where he states: 
"As to the evidence in this case, I believe that 
.a careful study of the transeri pt and the findings 
of fact and memorandum decision of the trial 
court will show that there is no evidence or no 
finding by the court of any act of deceit, decep-
tion, concealment, misrepresentation, solicitation 
or coercion on the part of Macfarlane or any at-
tempt on his part to encourage or create discord 
between G.ail Swan and her sister, Theo, or to 
persuade Gail to omit Theo from her will." 
If the trial court didn't follow the "prin~a facie evi-
dence rule" that leaves only the "preponderance of the 
evidence rule" and the "clear and convincing evidence 
rule" that the trial court could have followed. In view 
of the fact that nobody ever mentioned the "preponder-
ance of evidence rule" or cited any cases in support of 
that rule, and in view of the fact th.at counsel for contest-
ant contended so earnestly for the "clear and convincing 
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evidence rule" plus the fact that the trial court agreed 
'vith counsel for contestant and adopted without change 
their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, it 
is cle.ar beyond dispute that the trial court did in fact 
adopt the "clear and convincing evidence rule." 
This conclusion becomes even more apparent when 
we consider the uncertainty of our own supreme court 
on the subject of presumptions. The Bryan case quite 
clearly adopted the "printa facie evidence rule" in a will 
rontest case. Yet eight months after the trial court's 
opinion in the case at har this court in Jardine v. Archi-
bald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, 'vhere a gift was made 
by a decedent to a fiduciary without consideration, stated: 
"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship exists between the donor 
and donee, equity raises a presumption against 
the validity of such transactions and the burden 
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity 
and that there was no fraud or undue influence by 
proving affirmatively and by clear and convincing 
evidence in compliance with equitable requisites." 
Now this court follows the "preponderance of the evi-
dence rule" and states: 
"This is contrary to our holding in the Jar-
dine case, which is supported by the California 
cases and some other decisions that cle.ar and con-
vincing evidence to the contrary is necessary to 
overco1ne such presumption. We reach this conclu-
sion because we feel that the rule is more clear 
and understandable than the rule requiring clear 
and convincing evidence; that this rule is more 
apt to produce .a just result and is more generally 
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recognized as the correct rule governing this 
situation." 
The hardships arising from confusion as to the lavv 
of Utah should not fall on the shoulders of either liti-
t;ant. Both are entitled to a trial according to what this 
court believes to be most conducive to producing a just 
result. 
The suprerne court of this state has developed a con-
siderable body of law outlining the distinction between 
preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing 
evidence, and in a recent case has reversed a trial court 
for instructing a jury that the burden of proving mutual 
rnistake of fact was by a preponderance of the evidence 
rather than by clear and convincing evidence. 
See K ir-chgester v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Rail'road Company (Dec. 14, 1950), ______ Utah ______ , 225 P. 
2d 754, where the court granted appellant's petition for 
rehearing in the follovving language: 
"The .appellant's petition for rehearing is 
granted to allow us to consider on its merits the 
question of whether the lower court erred in re-
fusing to instruct the jury that in order to avoid 
the release executed by the plaintiff, he must 
prove a mutual mistake of fact by clear and un-
equivocal evidence." 
The court reversed said case at 233 P. 2d 699, 700 
and stated: 
"The appellant's petition for rehearing was 
granted in this case to allow us to consider on its 
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merits the question wheth·er the trial court erred 
in denying the appellant's request that the jury 
be instructed that in order to avoid the release 
executed by the respondent, he must prove a mu-
tual mistake of fact by 'clear .and unequivocal' 
evidence. Instead, the court charged the jury that 
a mutual mistake of fact need only he proved by 
a 'preponderance of the evidence.' For the facts 
of the case, see our original opinion, Utah, 218 P. 
2d 685. 
"Upon the authorities cited in our opinion 
granting the petition for rehe.aring, Utah, 225 
P. 2d 754, we conclude that the lower court erred 
in the particular above mentioned and that such 
error necessitates a reversal of the case for a new 
trial. It would serve no us.eful purpose to further 
discuss those authorities here." 
The court then discussed the meaning of the words, 
cle.ar and convincing and stated: 
"We had occasion recently to examine the 
expression 'clear and convincing' evidence. See 
Greener v. Greener, Utah, 212 P. 2d 194, 205. 
There we remarked that 'for a matter to be clear 
and convincing to a particular mind it must at 
least have reached the point where there remains 
no serious or substantial doubt as to the correct-
ness of the conclusion. A mind which was of the 
opinion that it w.as convinced and yet which enter-
tained, not a light, but a reasonable doubt as to the 
correctness of its conclusions, would seem to be in 
a state of confusion.' 
"Further, we said: 'That proof is convincing 
which carries with it, not only the power to per-
suade the mind as to the probable truth or correct-
ness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the 
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element of clinching such truth or correctness. 
Clear .and convincing proof clinches what might 
be otherwise only probable to the mind.' See 
Southvvestern Bell Telephone Co. v. City of San 
Antonio, Texas, D.C., 4F. Supp. 570, 573 where it 
was stated that proof is not 'clear and convincing' 
if the court entertains a reasonable doubt." 
In Northcrest Incorporated v. Walker Bank and 
Trust Company) et al.) (Sept. 29, 1952), 248 P. 2d 692, 
this court .again defined the terms clear and convincing 
in the following language : 
"For evidence to be clear and convincing it 
must be such that there is no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion." 
On the other hand, the burden of proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence requires only that the proof 
be "more probable," or that it be of "greater weight" than 
evidence to the contrary. See Stoker v. Ogden City) (Feb. 
25, 1936), 54 P. (2) 849; Alvarado v. Tucker) (April 2/ 
1954), 2 Ut.ah 2d 16,268 P. (2) 986; John Ainsfield Co. v. 
Rasmussen) 30 Utah 453, 85 P. 1002·; Hickey v. Rio 
(}rande Western Ry. Co.) 29 Utah 392, 82 P. 29; and 
TVilkinson v . .Anderson Taylor Co.) 28 Utah 346, 79 P. 
46. 
The total sum of evidence presented by the contestant 
on the issue of fraud and undue influence was that the 
proponents occupied a confidential relationship with the 
testator, had an opportunity to exert fraud and undue 
influence, that Macfarlane prepared the will in which he 
'vas made a substantial beneficiary, and that Macfarlane 
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did not obtain independent advice for Gail. 
On the other side of the ledger was the uncontra-
dicted evidence that Gail had an abiding affection for 
Macfarlane, Kostopulos and the Bridges, 'vas deeply 
appreciative of their many acts of kindness and genuinely 
desired to make them beneficiaries in her will; that Gail 
appeared normal and competent to the witnesses to the 
will and codicils on the three occasions of execution; 
that the second codicil was actually witnessed by a medi-
cal doctor and a psychiatrist, who testified that in their 
opinion she was competent and business-like .at the time 
said codicil was executed; that the will and codicils were 
in existence five years during which Gail mingled freely 
with friends and relatives, alike; and that at the time 
Macfarlane was last claimed to have been exercising 
fraud and undue influence on Gail he was actually writ-
ing a codicil to her will reducing his interest in the amount 
of $24,500.00. 
It is difficult for us to believe that the foregoing 
evidence did not preponderate against a finding of fraud 
and undue influence. Counsel for contestant connnent-
ing on the length of time the will and codicils were in 
existence stated at page 57 of the Brief of Respondent: 
"Such fact, standing alone, may be evidence 
to be conside,red by the court, but it cannot be said 
to be clear and convincing proof." 
The many other important facts heretofore men-
tioned likewise would be entitled to consideration in de-
termining wherein lay the preponderance of evidence, but 
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rnay not have been considered clear and convincing proof. 
From the record it is reasonable to assume that the trial 
court believed the preponderance or greater weight of the 
evidence was against a finding of fraud and undue influ-
ence but that such evidence was not clear and convincing. 
Proponents \vere not accorded a chance to prev:ail on 
this issue if the evidence preponderated in their favor. 
This court has held that where a trial court sitting 
\vithout a jury renders its decision under a misimpres-
sion of the law and prejudice results, such decision will 
not be allowed to stand. 
In Walker v. Peterson, (Dec. 16, 1954) 3 Utah 2d 54, 
278 P~ 2d 291, the trial court, sitting without a jury, made 
the following comrnent as to the law applicable: 
"* * * He who makes the left turn on * * * 
through highways must take the responsibility re-
gardless of speed or any other circumstances,***" 
The court then found that both parties to the collision 
were negligent. This court in reversing the trial court 
n1ade the following statement: 
"It is true generally that statements made by 
the trial judge do not necessarily affect the val-
idity of a judgment if it is otherwise sustainable. 
But this is not true if the statements make mani-
fest that a material issue was analyzed by the 
court under an erroneous conception as to the law 
applicable thereto (as seems to have been done 
here) and under such circumstances that a correct 
application of the law might well have produced a 
different result. For the fact trier to be under 
such a 1nisapprehension of the law would be com-
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par.able to having the jury find a verdict under 
erroneous instructions as to the law." 
In the case of State v. Whitely, (Utah S. Ct., Feb. 
14, 1951), 110 P. 2d 337, the trial court sat 'vithout a jury 
where the defendant was charged with burglary in the 
second degree. The defense was that of alibi. In finding 
the defendant guilty, the trial court stated that it was 
bis belief defendant had the burden of proving an alibi. 
This court reversed the trial court holding that the bur-
den of proving guilt never shifts from the government 
in a criminal case. The court stated : 
"In the instant case, the statements made by 
the court were matters of law upon which if given 
to the jury this court would base its revers.al and 
order a new trial, as such instruction would have 
been erroneous. 
"The case is reversed and the cause remand-
ed for a new trial in accordance with the vie,vs 
expressed in this opnion." 
If this case had been tried before a jury and the 
jury had been instructed that it w:as incun1bent upon the 
proponents to establish a lack of fraud and undue in-
fluence by clear and convincing rather than by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, such an instruction under 
the Kirchgestner case, supra, would have been reversible 
error. The trial court as trier of the f.act rendered its 
decision under the same erroneous impression as to the 
law of the State of Utah. 
A "rill contest case is an action at la,v. See In re 
Hansen's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103; In re Swan's 
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Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, .and this court's major-
ity opinion herein. Therefore, this court cannot reweigh 
the evidence. Proponents should have an opportunity 
to establish their innocence of fraud and undue influence 
by a preponderance of the evidence if that is the law of 
·utah. Such an opportunity has never been accorded 
them. The trial court required cle.ar and convincing evi-
clence. This court has rejected that requirement and 
declared proponents right to trial under the preponder-
ance of evidence rule. But a mere declaration of right 
unless translated into action is as "sounding brass or a 
tinkling symbol." The only way the trial court's error 
c.an be corrected is by granting proponents a new trial. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT HAS HELD AS A MATTER OF LA\"'> 
THAT GAIL SWAN HAD 'TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO 
l\IAKE A WILL. THE ERRONEOUS FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT GAIL LACKED 
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL VITALLY 
AFFECTED THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE 
OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THEREBY 
PREJUDICED THE PROPONENTS. 
At page 6 of its memorandun1 decision, the trial court 
states: 
"As heretofore stated, I conclude that this 
contest must be sustained upon both grounds al-
leged in the complaint: 
1. That Wilda Gail Swan was incompetent to 
make the Will or Codicils. 
2. That in any event, the Will and Codicils 
were the product of .and resulted from fraud and 
undue influence of both Macfarlane and Kostopu-
los." 
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In its Findings of Fact, Numbers 25, 26, 27 and 30, 
the trial court finds that when the will and codicils were 
executed, Gail lacked testamentary capacity. In its Con-
clusions of Law, Numbers 1, 3, 5 and 7, the court con-
cludes as a matter of law that Gail lacked testamentary 
capacity to execute a will on the three occasions when 
the will and codicils were executed. 
The quality of mind of the alleged victim is an im-
portant factor in determining the issue of fraud and un-
due influence. Obviously a strong minded individual is 
less apt to succumb to fraud and undue influence than 
one with a weak mind. A person having testamentary 
capacity is a less likely object of fraud and undue in-
fluence than a person lacking testamentary cap.acity. 
The trial court held and apparently believed that 
Gail was so lacking in mentality that she did not have 
sufficient mind and memory to remember who were the 
rtatural objects of her bounty, recall to mind her property, 
and dispose of its understandingly according to some 
plan forrned in her mind. This erroneous impression of 
the facts on the part of the trial court unquestionably 
placed an improper burden on proponents in negating the 
presumption of fraud and undue influence. This court 
1n holding that the evidence did not sustain a finding of 
lack of testamentary c.a pacity stated: 
''This evidence when considered separately or 
all together does not indicate a lack of testamen-
tary capacity but at most merely indicates a slight-
ly below nor1nal adult mental .age. It does not 
indicate that she did not remember the natural 
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objects of her bounty or did not keep in mind her 
property or lack of ability to dispose of it under-
standingly in accordance with some purpose or 
plan. This is especially true in view of the volume 
of evidence to the contrary. The contestant had 
the burden of proving or persuading the trier of 
the fact by the evidence that she lacked testamen-
tary capacity. We conclude that in view of all of 
the evidence the finding of the trial court that she 
lacked testamentary capacity was unreasonable 
and must be reversed." 
In an atten1pt to cleanse the record of the trial court's 
error, this court adopts the following procedure: 
"The case is remanded with directions that the 
findings and decree be corrected in accordance 
with the views herein expressed, but that the de-
cision of the trial court be affirmed to the effect 
that the bequests to !1:acfarlane and Kostopulos 
are null and void for fr.aud and undue influence." 
But the serious question is, does the remanding of the 
case to the trial court vvith directions to correct its er-
roneous decision cleanse the record of prejudice to the 
proponents? This court in its majority opinion concedes 
that such prejudice in fact occurred when it states: 
"The fact that Gail had testamentary capa-
city makes it more probable that she was not in-
duced to make these bequests by fraud or undue 
influence." 
The trial court's misimpression on this issue so color-
Ed the finding on the issue of fraud and undue influence 
that the only vvay in which the record can be corrected 
and true justice done the parties is for this court to 
grant a new trial. One of the trial judges of this juris-
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diction has a saying that would seem to be p.articularly 
appropriate here. "You can take the fly out of the soup, 
but you can't take the taste of the fly out of the soup." 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
ERRONEOUSLY DECLARED THAT IT WAS MACFAR-
LANE'S "CLEAR, UNREVOCABLE DU'TY" TO SEE TO IT 
THAT WILDA GAIL SWAN HAD INDEPENDEN'T ADVICE 
IN CONNEtCTION WITH THE PREPARATION AND SIGN-
ING OF THE WILL ANI) CODICILS. THIS COURT STATES 
IN ITS DECISION HEREIN, "AS IN 'THE JARDINE CASE, 
'VE RE,COGNIZE SUCH A SHOWING AS AN IMPORTANT 
F AICTOR IN DETERlVIINING THIS QUES'TI!ON AND RE-
JECT THE DOCTRINE !THAT WI'THOUT IT SUCH A PRE-
SUMPTION IS IRREBUTTABLE." THIS COURT SHOULD 
GRANT A NEW TRIAL SO THAT THE TRIER OF THE FACT 
MAY CONSIDER LACK OF INDEPENDENT ADVICE NOT 
AS AN "UNREVOKABLE" OB8TAtCLE OF PROOF ON THE 
PART OF THE CONFIDENTIAL ADVISOR, BUT ONLY AS 
AN "IMPORTANT FACTOR." 
During the trial, eounsel for contestant con-
tended that failure of ~Iacfarlane to see to it that 
G-ail had independent advice before she executed the will 
and codicils 'vas decisive of the ease. This is indicated 
by the following statement appearing at page 16 of thejr 
trjal 1nemor.andum with reference to the Omega lnvest-
1.nent ease, supra: 
"Please note that the Supreme Court of Utah 
gave its fine approval in the foregoing to the de-
cision of the Oklahoma court that, it is his duty, 
before accepting the conveyance, to see to it that 
the grantor had disinterested advice and full 
information." 
Although the language of the Onzegn In vestrnent 
('o. case, supra, does not contain the meaning contended 
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for iti·;,by ;counsel at the time of trial, there is no doubt~ 
that the t~ial court adopted such meaning, and .applied it 
to the case at bar. At page 2 of his Memorandum De-
cision, the Court states: 
"* * * In the circumstances surrounding the 
signing of this purported Will, Macfarlane cer-
tainly was in a position of such dominating influ-
ence that it was his clear ttnrevocable duty to see 
to it that vVilda Gail Swan had independent ad-
vice in connection with the preparation and sign-
ing of such .an important document." 
In \V ebster's New International Dictionary, Second 
}~dition, Unabridged, the word revoke is variously defined 
as to revise, to repeal, to rescind, to cancel, to withdraw. 
The prefix "un" when used with verbs is declared to ex-
press the contrary or reversal and not the simple nega-
tive of the action of the verb to which it is prefixed. 
Thus, it can be seen that the trial court believed 
that ~iacf.arlane had a duty to secure independent advice 
that could not be revoked, revised, repealed, rescinded, 
cancelled or withdrawn. 
This court, eight months after the memorandum de-
cision of the trial court elaborated upon the law with 
respect to the need for independent advice where fidu-
ciary relationships were involved in the case of Jardine 
v. Arch.ibald, supra, where it stated: 
"Appellants also cite Omega Investment Co. 
v. Woolley, 72 Utah 474, 271 P. 797 as placing 
Utah with the jurisdictions holding that inde-
pendent advice is necessary to sustain a transac-
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tion where a fiduciary relationship exists. We do 
not understand that case to have so held." 
Counsel for contestant in the Brief of Respondent 
have conceded that their original position with regard to 
the need for independent advice was erroneous in view of 
the interpretation of the Omega Investment Co. case, 
supra, by this court in the Jardine case, supra, where they 
state at page 37 : 
"It is noted, however, that in Jardine v. Archi-
bald, supra, this court stated that by its decision in 
Omega v. Woolley, it did not intend to make inde-
pendent advice an inflexible necessity." 
To summarize the situation, counsel for contestant 
contended during the trial that the need for independent 
.. advice was an inflexible necessity. The trial court held 
'vith contestant and stated in his Memorandum Decision 
that Macfarlane had a clear unrevokable dttty to see to 
it that Gail had independent advice before executing the 
"Till. Under these circumstances the fact that the evi-
dence preponderated against the claim of fraud and 
11ndue influence became of secondary nnportance. It was 
conceded that no independent advice was obtained for 
Gail, and this settled the issue in the mind of the trial 
court. If the trial court in effect held, as 've contend, 
that without independent advice the presumption of fraud 
and undue influence is irrebuttable, the case probably 
turned on this proposition alone. Here again the trial 
court has taken an erroneous vie'v of the law; one up-
on which its decision may well have turned, and one which 
\Vould seern to demand a new trial with the fact of lack of 
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independent advice cast in its proper perspective. We 
quote from the majority opinion: 
"As in the Jardine case, we recognize such a 
showing as an important factor in determining 
this question and reject the doctrine that without 
it stttch presumption is irrebuttable." 
POINT IV. 
THIS COURT HAS REJECTED THE "PRIMA FACIE 
EVIDENCE RULE" ADVOCA'TED BY PR.OPONENTS AND 
HAS APPROVED THE "PREPONDERANCE OF THE EV-
IDENCE RULE." WITH THE BURDEN OF PROVING A 
LACK OF FRAUD AND UNDUE INFLUENCE BY A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RESTING WITH PRO-
PONENTS, THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION INTO EV-
IDEN~CE OVER OBJECTION OF DEFENDENTS OF THE 
FILE IN THE BECKER MATTER INDICATING THAT ONCE 
BEFORE MACFARLANE HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF FRAUD 
AND UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL. 
THE FACT THE TRIAL COURT STATED THAT HE 
THOUGHT SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PROPER AND WAS AD-
MISSIBLE INDICATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT CON-
SIDERED IMPROPER MATTERS IN ARRIVING AT ITS 
DECISION. 
At and follovving the trial of this case, it was the 
position of the proponents that upon admission of prima 
facie evidence showing .a lack of fraud and undue influ-
ence the presu1nption would disappear. It was clear that 
no actual evidence of fraud and undue influence existed 
in the case and we firmly believed that the trial court 
would find as a matter of law that contestant had failed 
to sustain her burden of proof on that issue. Such was 
our position on appeal to this court. This court has now 
declared that the burden of proof remained with pro-
ponents to establish a lack of fraud and undue influence 
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by .a preponderance of the evidence. With the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence rule" to guide a determination 
of this issue, factors which might affect the credibility of 
the witnesses now become of utmost importance. Coun-
sel for contestant offered in evidence at the trial the file 
in the Estate of George C. Becker, Case No. 31409 which 
contained the record of a will contest and an allegation 
that M.acfarlane had exerted fraud and undue influence 
upon the decedent. The following events took place as 
shown at Record 244: 
"J\1R. ROBERTS: In order for the record, 
we'd like to make an objection, your Honor, as to 
the materiality of this matter on anything pertain-
ing to this case. 
THE COURT: Well, I think it has, ~Ir. Rob-
erts, some materiality. Just how much materiality 
it has this court isn't in a position to say, but I arn 
going to receive it in evidence and you may have 
your exception to the court's ruling." 
And again at Record 245: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Ray, will you state to the 
court the materiality of the proposed exhibit, as 
you view it~ 
lVIR. RAY: Yes. I'll he glad to, if the court 
please. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. RAY: This witness is a 1nen1ber of the 
bar. He is an officer of this court. He is here 
charged with imposing upon his client. He has 
testified that he made no effort to see that this 
woman had any independent advice whatsoever. 
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Now right while these matters were going on he 
was charged in another case with being the bene-
ficiary in the will of his client, a will which he 
himself drew. That put him on notice, if he didn't 
have it before, of what the duties and obligations 
of a lawyer are to his client. 
THE COURT: From that standpoint you 
deem it material~ 
MR. RAY: Yes. 
MR. ROBERTS: We object to it, your Honor, 
on the ground that it is immaterial. 
TI-IE COURT: The court will overrule the 
objection, and adhere to the former statement 
made by the court. It will be received in evidence." 
Counsel for contestant claimed in support of the 
Becker evidence that the fact Macfarlane w.as accused 
of fraud and undue influence in that case put him on 
notice "of \vhat the duties and obligations of a lawyer 
are to his client." That was the sole purpose for which 
the evidence was offered. l\o effort was made by coun-
sel to relate just what were the "duties and obligations~' 
to which he had reference. Counsel did make some refer-
ence to the fact that Macfarlane did not obtain independ-
ent advice for Gail. But the Becker matter could neither 
add to nor distract from this undisputed fact. 
The issue was whether Macfarlane practiced fraud 
and undue influence on Gail, not the quality of his knowl-
edge as to the duties and obligations "of a lawyer to his 
client." If he had a keener knowledge of his duties this 
"'Nould make it less not more likely that he practiced fraud 
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and undue influence on a client and if he practiced fraud 
and undue influence whether he did this act ,vith a keen 
or a dull sense of duty would not add or detract fro1n the 
illegality of the will. This is not a punitive action. This 
is an action to determine legality of a will. 
M.acfarlane was absolutely innocent of any wrong-
doing in the Becker matter. The contest "ras dismissed 
and the will admitted to probate. But no amount of 
protestation of innocence or claim of immateriality could 
remove the harmful effect of this evidence. The stubborn 
truth is that the sole and only purpose for introducing 
the Becker matter in evidence was to inflame the mind 
of the trial court and to accomplish by prejudice what 
could not be accomplished by legitimate evidence. The 
~uccess of this dubious enterprise can be seen in the re-
sults achieved. 
Furthermore, it cannot no'v be successfully contended 
that the trial court was not influenced by such evidence, 
'vhere he declared in allowing its admission that he 
thought it material and proper. 
The general rule as to .ad1nissibility of this type evj-
clence is set forth in 32 C.J.S. 433 Sec. 579 as follows: 
"Evidence of similar acts or transactions is 
inadmissible when irrelevant to the issues in the 
case. Thus the law will not consider evidence that 
a person has, or has not, done .a certain act at a 
particular time as probative of a contention that 
he has, or has not, done a similar act at another 
ti1ne." 
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And in 1 Jones on Evidence, 247 Sec. 140 it is said: 
"The question of relevancy frequently arises 
when the offered proof relates to transactions, acts 
and declarations of strangers or of one of the par-
ties to the action in his dealings with strangers. 
Evidence of the latter sort in general, it would 
be manifestly unjust to admit, since the conduct 
of one man under certain circumstances or toward 
certain individuals, varying .as it will necessarily 
do according to the motives which influence· him, 
the qualities he possesses and his knowledge of 
the character of those with whom he is dealing, can 
never afford a safe criterion by which to judge 
of the behavior of another man similarly situated, 
or of the same man toward other persons." 
See also the following cases cited by Jones in support 
of the foregoing proposition: 
Ilartrnan v. Evans, 38 \V. Va. 669, 18 S.E. 810, where 
evidence that the plaintiff habitually made usurious 
loans to persons other than the defendant is irrelevant 
to the issue as to usury in a loan to defendant. 
Davis v. }If eyer, 115 ~J eb. 251, 212 N.W. 435, 50 
A.I.J.R. 1410, where it was held that circulation by others 
{Jf rumors similar to the defamatory statements by the 
defendant is irrelevant in an action of slander. 
I-Iere no effort was made to show that the f.acts in 
the Becker matter were at all like the facts regarding 
l\1acfarlane's treatment of Gail. The reason given for 
offering said evidence on its face demonstrated that the 
evidence did not relate to any legitimate issue in the case. 
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And the evidence had the vice of giving rise to dark fore-
bodings and suspicions which were unfounded in fact and 
extremely prejudicial in nature. 
CONCLUSION 
( 1) This court has declared that the best rule and 
the rule it is following in this case is that proponents had 
the burden of proving lack of fraud and undue influence 
by a preponderance of the evidence. At the time of trial 
nobody had the .remotest idea that the preponderance of 
evidence rule was the law of Utah. No cases were cited 
or argument made in behalf of said rule. Counsel for 
proponents earnestly urged that the "prima facie evidence 
rule" applied. Counsel for contestant just as earnestly 
urged that the "clear and convincing evidence rule" ap-
plied. Contestant prevailed and the trial court signed 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by 
counsel for contestant without a single change. The con-
clusion is inesc.a pable that the trial court followed the 
"clear and convincing evidence rule." We believe that in 
com1non justice proponents should be entitled to not just 
the hardships of the "preponderance of evidence rule" 
but to the benefits as 'veil. Proponents should have an 
opportunity to prove lack of fraud and undue influence 
by a preponderance of the evidence if that is the la'v 
of lTtah. They have certainly never yet had this oppor-
tunity. 
In the K irchgestner case, supra, this court has de-
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clared that the difference in burden of proof between clear 
and convincing evidence and preponderance of the evi-
dence is so vital that to impose one burden when the other 
is proper is prejudicial and reversible error. In the 
]{ irchgestner case, this court granted .a rehearing to air 
the very point we are now raising and reversed its own 
previous stand. We sincerely feel that we should be given 
the same opportunity here. 
( 2) This court has very justifiably held as a matter 
of la-\v that Gail had testamentary c.apacity to make a wilL 
The trial court incorrectly held both as a legal proposi-
tion and as a proposition of fact that Gail did not have 
testamentary c.apacity. 
We ask the simple question, would proponents' 
chances of prevailing on the issue of fr.aud and undue 
influence have been enhanced if the trial court had cor-
rectly found as fact and determined as law that Gail 
had testamentary capacity~ This Court, in its majority 
opinion, has conceded that such would be the case, and has 
thus conceded the prejudice to proponents from this obvi-
ous error by the trial court. 
When the trial court's erroneous decision that Gail 
lacked testamentary capacity is added to the trial court's 
erroneous application of the "clear and convincing evi-
dence rule" with regard to burden of proof the prejudice 
to proponents is compounded many fold. 
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(3) The trial court has in1posed upon Macfarlane 
the "clear, unrevocable duty" to have seen to it that Gail 
Swan had independent advice in connection with the 
preparation and signing of the will and codicils. 
This court in the Jardine case, supra, and in its ma-
jority opinion here has recognized lack of independent 
advice as an important factor but has rejected the doc-
trine that without it the presumption of fraud and undue 
influence is irrebuttable. The trial court's erroneous 
impression of the law on this subject was decidedly pre-
judicial to proponents. 
( 4) The trial court wrongfully admitted in evidence 
and considered the inflammatory Becker matter. This 
evidence was duly accepted to by counsel for proponents. 
At the time we wrote the Brief of Appellants we be-
lieved that the issue of fraud and undue influence would 
be resolved as in the Bryan case, supra, and that con-
siderations of weight of evidence and credibility of wit-
nesses would be immaterial. But in view of the present 
decision of this court, where the credibility of Macfarlane 
n1ay very well have been decisive of the case, this highly 
inflammatory and improper evidence becomes of vital 
i1nportance. 
This evidence may very well have cast into the 
court's n1ind such a feeling of bias and prejudice as to 
have rendered him incapable of believing J\tfacfarlane 
even though there was no other evidence which in any 
Inanner effected his credibility or good character. 
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\Ve respectfully sub1nit that a rehearing should be 
granted in order that this 1-Ionorable Court may have an 
opportunity to fully hear and consider the new issues 
raised by its majority decision herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Grant Macfarlane 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
N. J. COTRO-MANES 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
RECEIVED ---------------- copies of the within Petition 
for Rehearing and Brief in Support thereof this _______________ _ 
day of April, 1956. 
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